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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
It is a fundamental tenet of the American judicial system that an indigent 
defendant is afforded the same rights and protections as their more affluent counterpart. 
See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion). James Lloyd 
Todd entered a plea of guilty to grand theft by false pretenses and/or embezzlement. At 
sentencing the prosecuting attorney argued, because he believed Mr. Todd would be 
unable to pay the restitution back, the district court should "tak[e] his time." The district 
court followed the inappropriate recommendation by the prosecutor, weighing heavily as 
sentencing factor, Mr. Todd's purported inability to pay restitution. The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Todd. On 
appeal, Mr. Todd asserts that his rights under both the Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the district court 
punished him based on his indigent status. Alternatively, Mr. Todd contends that the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him based 
on his purported indigency and in light of the mitigating factors present in his case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In July of 2007, Mr. Todd was charged by State's Information with grand theft by 
false pretenses and/or embezzlement. (R., pp.27-28.) Mr. Todd, refusing to wait for a 
plea offer from the State, entered a guilty plea to the charged offense, without any plea 
agreement or promised sentence recommendation from the State. (R., pp.31-43; Tr., 
p.5, L.14 - p.6, L.13.) At sentencing, in response to Mr. Todd and defense counsel's 
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request that he be placed on probation, so that he could begin paying restitution, the 
prosecuting attorney argued: 
Also, with regard to restitution, I know Mr. Todd is not going to pay all this 
money back. There's $60,000 here that is owed. He doesn't have a dime 
to his name right now and that money is not going to be seen by 
Mr. Lewis. I think that is the reason, you know, if he can't pay this money 
back, he has to pay it back another way, and I think taking his time is the 
only thing that the Court has in order to impose punishment because the 
money he stole, who knows whatever happened to that. 
(Tr., p.52, Ls.4-12 (emphasis added).) The district court, in refusing to place Mr. Todd 
on probation, chose to impose an aggregate twelve year sentence, with four years fixed, 
upon him, in part because of its belief that Mr. Todd did not have the ability to pay the 
restitution amount. 1 (See Tr., p.57, L.8- p.61, L.15.) Mr. Todd filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.59-61.) 
1 If, as both the prosecutor and district court apparently believed, Mr. Todd did not have 
the ability to ever repay the $57,083.90 restitution ordered, it was potentially error for 
the State to seek and the district court to order the restitution amount. See J.C. § 19-
5704(7). However, because Mr. Todd stipulated to the restitution order, that issue 
cannot be now raised on appeal. 
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ISSUE 
1. Were Mr. Todd's rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated when the district court 
based its decision to impose a long prison sentence upon Mr. Todd based in part 
on his inability to pay the restitution actually imposed? 
2. Alternatively, did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a unified 
sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Todd based on his 




Mr. Todd's Rights Under Both The Due Process Clause And The Equal Protection 
Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Were Violated When The District Court Based 
Its Decision To Impose A Lengthy Prison Sentence Upon Mr. Todd Almost Entirely On 
Mr. Todd's Indigent Status 
A. Introduction 
The State argued that because Mr. Todd did not have the ability to pay 
restitution, the district court should "tak[e] his time." The district court obliged the 
prosecutor's recommendation and imposed a lengthy prison sentence, based "heavily" 
on Mr. Todd's inability to pay restitution. In doing so, the district court violated 
Mr. Todd's rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by punishing him for being poor in one of the most 
affluent counties in the State. 
B. Mr. Todd's Rights Under Both The Due Process Clause And The Equal 
Protection Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Were Violated When The 
District Court Based Its Decision To Impose A Lengthy Prison Sentence Upon 
Mr. Todd Almost Entirely On Mr. Todd's Indigent Status 
The United States Supreme Court has long protected indigent defendants in the 
criminal justice system, because as Justice Black stated in 1956, "(T]here can be no 
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he 
has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (striking down a 
state practice of granting appellate review only to those persons who could afford the 
transcript); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-358 (1963) (holding that 
indigent defendants are entitled to counsel on first direct appeal}; Roberts v. LaVallee, 
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389 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1967) (holding that an indigent defendant is entitled to a free 
transcript of the preliminary hearing for use during the trial); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 
189, 198-199 (1971) (holding that an indigent defendant cannot be denied an adequate 
record to appeal a conviction, even under a fine-only statute). 
When addressing a claim that an indigent defendant was treated differently from 
his more affluent counterpart, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
both due process and equal protection principles merge in its analysis. Beardon v. 
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). The Beardon Court acknowledged that, "[m]ost 
decisions in this area have rested on an equal protection framework, although Justice 
Harlan in particular has insisted that a due process approach more accurately captures 
the competing concerns." Id. (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S., at 29-39, 76 S. Ct., at 
595-600 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259-266, 90 
S. Ct. 2018, 2031-2034, 26 LEd.2d 586 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). However, it will 
"generally analyze the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the 
State under the Due Process Clause, while ... approach[ing] the question whether the 
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to 
another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. (citing Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-609 (1974)). 
1. Mr. Todd's Claim That His Rights Under Both The Equal Protection Due 
Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Were Violated. Is 
Preserved For Appellate Review 
Unfortunately, Mr. Todd's defense counsel did not object to either the 
prosecutor's argument that the district court should punish Mr. Todd for his indigency, or 
the district court's oral statements that it was going to "heavily" consider Mr. Todd's 
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indigent status in imposing a stiff prison sentence. (See Tr., p.21 - p.61.) However, the 
denial of an indigent defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and 
equal protection is fundamental error. See State v. Wilson, 724 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Ariz. 
App. Ct. 1986) (holding that defendant did not waive flaws in the revocation proceeding 
by failing to object below as the error committed by the district court relating to the 
defendant's indigent status, is fundamental). 
2. The District Court Improperly Based Its Decision To Impose A Stiff Prison 
Sentence Upon Mr. Todd On His Indigent Status 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor addressed the district court by arguing 
that Mr. Todd is a professional criminal that has abandoned his children. (Tr., p.28, L.9 
- p.32, L.1.) In response, defense counsel argued that the prosecutor was completely 
wrong with regard to the circumstances of Mr. Todd's children and, in fact, Mr. Todd had 
been working to provide food and shelter for his children. (Tr., p.32, L.5 - p.36, L.6.) 
Defense counsel also clarified the record, noting that Mr. Todd had not had a criminal 
conviction since 1985. (Tr., p.40, Ls.6-14.) Counsel for Mr. Todd indicated that 
Mr. Todd's main goal is to pay back the victim the money he took, and help to provide 
for his children to become a better father. (Tr., p.39, Ls.15-18.) Thus, defense counsel 
asked that Mr. Todd be placed on probation so that he could have the opportunity to 
pay the restitution he owes and take care of his family. (Tr., p.41, L.19 - p.46, L.12.) 
Mr. Todd then spoke to the district court, apologized for his actions, and asked that he 
be given the opportunity to take care of his children and pay restitution. (Tr., p.46, L.23 
- p.50, L.25.) 
6 
The prosecutor then responded, first attacking Mr. Todd's parenting skills, then 
stating: 
Also, with regard to restitution, I know Mr. Todd is not going to pay all this 
money back. There's $60,000 here that is owed. He doesn't have a dime 
to his name right now and that money is not going to be seen by 
Mr. Lewis. I think that is the reason, you know, if he can't pay this money 
back, he has to pay it back another way, and I think taking his time is the 
only thing that the Court has in order to impose punishment because the 
money he stole, who knows whatever happened to that 
(Tr., p.52, Ls.4-12 (emphasis added).) The district court addressed the parties. Even 
though at the time of sentencing, Mr. Todd had a job opportunity if he were placed on 
probation (See Tr., p.41, Ls.14-22), the district court found that Mr. Todd's ability to 
repay the money was "a very slim possibility." It continued: 
Like I said, I consider it a heavy sentencing factor that there's probably no 
ability or very limited ability to pay any of this money back. It appears to 
be all gone. There's a stipulation that he took at least $57,000, which is a 
significant amount of money, and he has almost no ability to repay it 
(Tr., p.58, Ls.17-22.) 
The district court then acknowledged that the PSI investigator had recommended 
probation, but stated: 
I can't look at the citizens of this county and say that's okay, probation is 
okay. I can't do it I owe the public that much and Mr. Lewis that it 
requires a prison sentence. I wish I could say, sure, pay it back, I'll give 
you every opportunity to do that, and I can let you do that I can't do that. 
(Tr., p.60, L.25 - p.61, L.6.) The district court then proceeded to impose an aggregate 
sentence only two years short of the maximum fourteen year sentence. (Tr., p.61, Ls.7-
13.) The United States Supreme Court has addressed the differential treatment of 
indigent defendants in three similar situations. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 
(1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
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In Williams, the defendant was sentenced to the maximum prison term and fine 
authorized under the statue, but, because the defendant could not afford to pay the fine, 
the court imprisoned the defendant an additional day for every $5 of the fine he could 
not pay. Williams, 399 U.S. at 236-237. The Williams Court held that the State cannot 
subject a certain class of convicted defendant's to a period of imprisonment beyond the 
statutory maximum because they are too poor to pay a fine. Id. at 243. Similarly, in 
Tate, the defendant was convicted under a fine only statute, and because he was 
unable to pay the fine, the lower court converted the fine into a jail term. Tate, 401 U.S. 
at 396. The United States Supreme Court held that a state cannot convert a fine into a 
jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine in 
full. Id. at 398-399. Thus, the crux of both the Williams and Tate decisions is that it is 
improper for a criminal defendant to be punished more severely through incarceration 
on the basis of his inability to pay a fine or restitution. 
Most recently, in Beardon v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court again 
reaffirmed its earlier decisions protecting a criminal defendant against punishment 
solely based on his indigent status. The Beardon Court was presented with the 
question of whether a sentencing court could properly revoke probation based on a 
defendant's failure to pay a fine without evidence and findings that he was somehow 
responsible for the failure to pay the fine, rather than that he simply lacked the financial 
resources. Beardon, 461 U.S. at 660-661. In reaching its decision, the Court drew from 
its prior opinions in Williams and Tate, for the proper analysis of the issue. Reading 
from Williams and Tate, the Court observed that "if the State determines a fine or 
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restitution to be the appropriate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a 
person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it." Id. at 668. 
The Court stated that whether the case is analyzed under the Due Process 
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, a court must inquire into such factors as "the 
nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality 
of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of 
alternative means for effectuating the purpose .... " Id. at 666-667 (quoting Williams v. 
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)). Ultimately, the Court held: 
in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a 
sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the 
probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide 
efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke 
probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the 
authorized range of its sentencing authority. If the probationer could not 
pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, 
the court must consider alternate measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not adequate to meet the 
State's interests in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a 
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do 
otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply 
because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a 
deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Id. at 672-673. 
Here, applying the factors as set forth in Beardon, it becomes clear that the 
district court violated Mr. Todd's rights under both the Due Process and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the time of the offense, Mr. Todd 
was neither on probation nor parole, but a contributing member of society and thus had 
a significant individual interest in continuing to live in society, while on probation. In 
fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently acknowledged the distinctions between a 
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defendant incarcerated while on a retained jurisdiction and a defendant currently on 
probation or parole. See State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 609, 167 P.3d 357, 360 (Ct. 
App. 2007). The Braaten Court observed that "[t]here is a crucial distinction between 
being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty 
that one desires," rather, "[i]t is 'the difference between losing what one has and not 
getting what one wants."' Id. at 609-610, 167 P.3d 360-361 (quoting Greenholz v. 
Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)). Thus, unlike the 
defendant in Braaten, Mr. Todd has a substantial interest in remaining at liberty and is 
not "being denied a conditional liberty that one desires." See id. 
"The next factor to be weighed is the State's interest or purpose and the 
rationality of the connection between the purpose and the means used to accomplish it." 
Id. at 610, 167 P.3d at 361. In Braaten, the defendant was convicted of sex abuse of a 
child and sought to be placed on probation, but could not afford the sex offender 
treatment and housing. Id. at 606-608, 157 P.3d 657-659. The Braaten Court found 
that the State had a legitimate interest in protecting society against criminals who 
cannot be adequately supervised, or present an undue risk of reoffense due to lack of 
treatment. Id. at 610, 167 P.3d at 361. In the instant case, the State's interests were 
two fold, protecting society against reoffense and ensuring that the victim in the instant 
case is able to recover lost monies resulting from the criminal offense. While the State 
attempted to classify Mr. Todd as a career criminal, the fact of the matter is that the 
instant case is the first criminal conviction Mr. Todd has had in twenty years. (Tr., p.40, 
Ls.6-14.) In fact, the PSI investigator had concluded that probation would be 
appropriate in Mr. Todd's case and that Mr. Todd could do the necessary programming 
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while on probation. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.9-10.) 
Moreover, the State's proposed solution to "tak[e] his time," in lieu of restitution 
payment, directly contradicts its interest in ensuring that the victim in this case is able to 
recoup his losses. 
Finally, Mr. Todd suggested an alternative to incarceration, that he be placed on 
probation such that he could take care of his children and make restitution payment, 
with a job that he could have started as soon as he was placed on probation. (Tr., p.41, 
Ls.14-21.) Accordingly, Mr. Todd asserts that his rights under both the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were when the 
district court imposed a lengthy prison sentence almost entirely based upon his indigent 
status. 
11. 
Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing A Unified Sentence 
Of Twelve Years. With Four Years Fixed. Upon Mr. Todd. Based On His lndigency And 
By Failing To Consider The Mitigating Factors Present In His Case 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing A Lengthy Prison Sentence 
Upon Mr. Todd Based On His Indigent Status 
Mr. Todd asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 
lengthy prison sentence based on its belief that Mr. Todd would be unable to pay 
restitution in the instant case. 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
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State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600; 768 P.2d 1331, 1333; (1989) (citing Associates 
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603,605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987)). In 
the instant case, Mr. Todd contends the district court did not act within the boundaries of 
its discretion nor base its decision on the exercise of reason when it considered his 
indigency in determining whether Mr. Todd should be placed on probation. The 
argument in support of Mr. Todd's claim that the district court erred in imposing a 
lengthy sentence based on his indigent status is set forth above in section I, and need 
not be repeated, but is incorporated herein by reference. 
B. The District Court Also Erred By Failing To Adequately Consider The Mitigating 
Factors Present In Mr. Todd's Case In Imposing A Lengthy Prison Sentence 
Uoon Hirn 
Mr. Todd asserts that given any view of the facts and circumstances of his case, 
his unified sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed, is excessive. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized that acceptance of responsibility and remorse are two 
mitigating factors that might warrant a reduction in sentence. See State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 594, 651 P.2d 527, 528 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time offender who 
accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his rehabilitation 
efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55, 757 P.2d 211, 217-18 (Ct. 
App. 1988), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 787 P.2d 281 (1990) (reducing 
sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed remorse, and had 
been of good character before the offense at issue). Here, Mr. Todd evidenced his 
acceptance of responsibility for his criminal behavior by entering a plea of guilty to the 
charged offense. (R., pp.36-43.) Unlike the vast majority of criminal defendants, 
Mr. Todd entered his plea of guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement with the 
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State, and without the benefit of any sentencing recommendation by the State. (Tr., 
p.5, L.14 - p.6, L.13.) In addressing the district court, Mr. Todd stated, "Your Honor, I'm 
guilty. . .. I'm guilty, and I don't wish to look you in the eye or anyone else in the eye 
and say that I'm not guilty. I am. My guilt is always going to be guilt." (Tr., p.6, Ls.3-
13.) It cannot be said that Mr. Todd did not truly accept the responsibility of his criminal 
conduct and throw himself on the mercy of the court. 
Not only did Mr. Todd accept full responsibility for his criminal conduct, but he 
also expressed remorse for his criminal actions. In the PSI, Mr. Todd stated, "I am 
absolutely ashamed of what I have done. I have let down my children, employer, and 
myself. I wanted to give a better life to my children, promote the hotel, and impress 
people I met to 'fit in.' ... I am sincerely sorry." (PSI, p.3 (original in all caps).) Then, at 
sentencing, Mr. Todd reiterated his regret. 
Your Honor, Mr. Lewis gave me an opportunity to run his hotel and 
I abused that, and I'm in this courtroom now saying that I'm sorry, but I 
wanted to say I was sorry when this first happened, not just because I'm 
sitting here in front of you for sentencing now because I am truly sorry. 
And I apologize, Mr. Lewis, and I sincerely mean that, and not so 
the Court will have mercy on me, but you were a friend to me and I blew 
the opportunity and I'm sorry. 
(Tr., p.46, L.23 - p.47, L.7.) Thus, Mr. Todd has accepted full responsibility for his 
criminal conduct and expressed his sincere remorse for his criminal actions, which the 
district court failed to adequately consider in imposing an aggregate twelve-year 
sentence upon him. 
Additionally, while the State attempted to paint Mr. Todd as a career criminal, the 
truth of the matter is that the instant offense is Mr. Todd's first criminal conviction in over 
twenty years. (Tr., p.40, Ls.6-14; PSI, p.3.) During those twenty years, Mr. Todd was a 
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contributing member of society, working as a district manager in two other hotels in 
Nevada and Arizona. (PSI, pp.6-7.) In fact, had the district court placed Mr. Todd on 
probation, as the PSI investigator felt was the appropriate disposition of the case, 
Mr. Todd could have immediately began working for a Twin Falls company called 
Experience Works, where he could have begun paying of the large restitution amount 
owing as a result of his criminal conduct. (Tr., p.41, Ls.14-22.) It is also important to 
note that had the district court placed Mr. Todd on probation, or not imposed such a 
lengthy prison sentence, Mr. Todd could be employed and provide financial support to 
his children, whose mother passed away from cervical cancer. (PSI, pp.5-6.) 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Mr. Todd asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Todd respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand 
his case for a new sentencing hearing in front of a different district court judge. 
Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2008. 
ERIC: . FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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